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Tanzaria embarked  on a structurl adjustment  followed  the lauch of tde  Economic  Rccovery
program  in 1986  after a decade  of protracted  Programn  in 1986.  To put the Tan7anian  experi-
economic  decline.  Its program  was supported  by  ence  in context,  its performance  is also compared
the Intemational  Monetary  Fund and the World  with that of four Sub-Sahlaran  African  countries
Bank and was accompanied  by a substantial  - Ghana, Kenya,  Malawi and Uganda  - which
increase  in foreign  assistance.  After seven  years  embarked  on similar refomi nrograns during  the
of adjustment  the environment  for higher  eco-  1980s.
nomic  growth  has impmved,  but the results  are
only partially  encouraging:  economic  growth  has  The adjustment  of the macroeconomic  data
only slightly  exceeded  population  growth, and  shows that, contrary  to traditional  interpretation,
officially  measured  domestic  savings  have  Tanzania's increased  dependency  of foreign
deteriorated.  Meanwhile,  Tanzania's  dependency  assistance  did not lead to a deterioration  in
on foreign  assistance  has increased,  reflected  in a  domestic  savings  performance.  And most of the
deterioration  of the current  account  of the  foreign  assistance  was used for investment  rather
balance  of payments.  This has led to an increas-  than for consumption.  But the principal  differ-
ingly  heated debate about  whether  real adjust-  ence between  Tanzania  and the four Sub-Saharan
ment is in fact taking  place in Tanzania,  or  African  countries  sampled  was the efficiency
whether  foreign  aid has served to postpone  with which the foreign  assistance  was used.
adjustmnent  instead  of supporting  it.  Using  a measure  of macroeconomic  return  on
investment,  the comparison  shows that Tanzania
Agrawal,  Ahmed,  Mered,  and Nord shed  is getting  very little return  on domestic  invest-
light on the relationship  between  adjustment  and  ment even  after the introduction  of structural
aid dependency  on the basis of Tanzania's  reforms.  There are several  reasons  for this,
experience.  Tanzania's weak database  is adjusted  including  the  dominance  of the Tanzanian
in several  respects  to correct for the most glaring  economy  by a large and highWy  inefficient
deficiencies  in it. After adjustment  of the data-  parastatal  sector.  If Tanzania  is to generate  the
base, Tanzania's performance  is compared  in the  accelerated  growth  that it so urgently  needs, one
period 1981-85,  prior to when reforms  were  of the key areas  of policy reform  needs to be the
launched,  with that in the period 1986-90,  which  increase  in productivity  of domestic  investment.
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During the 1980s,  many  Sub-Saharan  African  (SSA) countries  adopted structural adjustment
programs in response to widespread  deterioration in economic performance.  Problems typically
included  burgeoning  fiscal deficits, mounting  external current account de.icits and external payment
arrears, and gross misalignments  in relative  prices. These  problems  had their root causes in domestic
economic  mismanagement,  exacerbated  by external shocks such as the dual oil price shocks in the
1970s and the ensuing global economic recession.  The ar.ti-inflationary  policies adopted in the
industrialized  countries in the early 1980s,  and the resulting  sharp rise in real interest rates, caught
many heavily indebted developing  countries  unprepared, and the relatively  high growth rates of the
1970s  were followed  by a severe economic  slump.
The adjustment  programs adopted by many SSA countries  during the 1980s  addressed both
the macroeconomic  distortions, as well as more deep-seated,  structural problems in the economies.
Usually supported by the IMF and the World Bank, the programs were also a key element in the
mohilization  of foreign donor support, both in the restructuring  of external  debt under the London
and Paris Clubs, as well as in obtaining increased  levels of development  assistance.
Tanzania is an example of one such SSA country that embarked upon a  wide-ranging
structural adjustment  program in 1986, after a decade of protracted  economic  decline. Its program
was supported by both the World Bank and the  .. ^F and was accompanied  by high levels of foreign
assistance. Between  1985  and 1990, the ratio of foreign  aid disbursement  to GDP increased  steadily.
This has led to an increasingly  heated debate about  whether  real adjustment  is in fact taking place in
Tanzania or whether, rather than helping to reduce the imbalances  in the economy, foreign aid is
serving merely  to perpetuate  them (Ratts0 1992). Rattso argues that, given the high level of foreign
aid, and the favorable climatic  conditions,  Tanzania's economic  growth rate h.,s been disappointing.
Moreover, noting -,at both internal  and external  deficits  have  widened  during the adjustment  process,
he concludes  that as foreign aid inflows increased,  domestic savings  performance  deteriorated. thus
making Tanzania more dependent on  inflows of  foreign aid,  and raising the question of  the
sustainability  of Tanzania's economic  reform program.- 2 -
,"he objective of this paper is to examine the relationship  between structural adjustment,
economic  performance  and aid dependency  in Tanzania. Specifically,  the paper attempts  to answer
the following  questions:
(1)  Did large foreign inflows  during the period of reform support structural adjustmnent
or did they merely serve to postpone  it?
(2)  Did increased foreign assistance  during the reform period substitute for domestic
savings, leading to a deterioration  in the domestic sav.n  gs effort?
(3)  Did increased  foreign assistance  lead to a consumption  boom in the economy  at the
expense  of investment?
(4)  Given the large inflows of foreign assistance, has the growth performance of the
economy  been adequate?
The rest of the paper is structured  as follows. In Section  n, we examine  the theoretical  and
empizical  issues  of aid flows and aid dependency,  and compare the inflow of aid to Tanzania with
that in four other SSA countries that also adopted structural reform measures during the 1980s:
Ghana, Kenya, Malawi and Uganda.  All five countries are considered, to some degree, success
stories within  Africa, and the increase in the volume  of foreign  aid to all of these countries  after they
launched  structural adjustment  programs is striking.  Section  III describes the major problems with
Tanzania's data, and the efforts that were made to improve  their quality. In Section  IV, we describe,
qualitatively,  some of the major policy changes  that accompanied  the structural adjustment  process
in Tanzania.  Section V attempts to quantify some of these policy measures, and to compare the
policies and outcomes  of Tanzania's reform program with those of the four comparator  countries.
Finally, in Section  VI, we summarize  and draw some policy conclusions.-3 -
11. Structural Adjustment and  Aid Flows
11.1  Overyiew  of the Lteroture
The role of external financial assistance in development has been extensively  discussed,
although rest'"s of the discussion  have not been conclusive. The theoretical  basis of analyzing  the
macroeconom;c  role of external  financing  in the 1950s  was  the saving-investment  gap and the Harrod-
Domar growth model.  Later, by modifying  the rigidities in the growth model and introducing  the
trade deficit, the two-gap models developed  by Chenery and Bruno (1962) and Chenery  and Strout
(1966) improved  on the analytical  framnework.  Taylor (1988, 1990)  anl Bacha (1990)  introduced  the
fiscal gap as another conistraint  requiring external  financing  to augmenim  the Government's  tax effort
in a noninflationary  way.  The two major conclusions  thai emerge from the literature with respect
to the effectiveness  of aid are that:  (i) foreign  aid should  aim at raising domestic savings  to a level
sufficient  to finance  the investment  needed  to sustain  the targeted  growth rate of GDP; and (ii) toreign
aid should not discourage the recipient countries from seeking to relieve the foreign exchange
constraint by improving  competitiveness  and export diversification.
The empirical relationship  between  the size of foreign assistance  and its impact  on both the
GDP growth rate as well as domestic savings  behavior has been extensively  debated. Some studies
have questioned  the usefulness  of aid and showed that there is little or no correlation between aid
inflows to developing countries and their GDP growth rates (for example, Gupta and Islam, 1983;
or Mosley, 1987)  and also that there is a negative  impact  of increased  foreign  aid on domestic  savings
(for exarnple, Weisskopf, 1972).  Other studies, however, do not confirm these relationships  and
there are a multitude  of studies that have generally (though not definitively)  conciuded that aid has
been beneficial to the growth prospects of developing countries (for example, Cassen, 1986; or
Riddell, 1987).
The IMF and the World Bank have also periodically  undertaken  reviews of the effectiveness
of the assistance they have provided to  countries that have adopted stabilization and structural
adjustment  measures.'  These studies have found that  aid provided  in the context of such reform
The World Bank  has  undertaken  three  rviews  of adjustmrent  lending  (RALs) in 1988, 1990, and 1992. The IMP haA
also  undertaken  annual  reviews  of experience  under  ESAF-supported  rrangements.A-
measures  has been  successful  in raising  GDP growth rates. domestic  savings  ratios, and export  ratios,
though these gains are more moderate for low income couAAti  ies than for others.  However, the
reviews have also found that in many countries, external  viability has not been achieved.
2.  Empiical  Evidence
The volume  of foreign  assistance  increased  sharply in Sub-Saharan  Africa  during the 10-year
period 1981-90. Figure 1 represents  data on the average annual inflow of net official development
assistance (ODA) I adjustment in SSA:  Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Tanz2nia, and Uganda.  For
purposes of comparison, tlde  period is divided into two halves:  the years 1981-85  define the pre-
reform period and the years 1986-90  define the period of reform.'  The substantial increase in aid
in all five countries during the period of reform i  striking. Figure 1 also shows that Tanzania has
remained the largest recipient of foreign assistance,  both in the rre-reform period and during the
period of reform.
2  The source  for all daa  on ODA are the World Bank's World Development Repoit,  nd  the African Development
Indicators (UNDP/World Bank, 1992), which obtain this data from the OECD.  The OECD databae  is based on
reporting from donors.  In this databae,  ODA is defrued to include outrigkt debt cancellations by donors but not the
debt reschedulings grnted  under the auspices of the Paii  Club.
3  The time period under review is held constant in this paper, despite slight differnce  in the  period when refornm were
introduced in different countries,  in order that  extenal  tems  of trade  shocks could be eliminated as a sourme  of
difference between the econoiic  perforr=ncs  of these countries.-5 -
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Figure 2 shows average aid flows as a percentage  of GDP for the five countries in the two
periods under consideration. It reveals that net disbursement  of ODA as a percentage of GDP has
increased in all five countries in the period of reform.  The sharpest increase has been in Tanzania
where this percentage went up from 13.5 in the pre-reform period to 34.7 in the period of reform.
Both in the pre-reform period and during the period of rei.m,  Tanzania has received the largest
amount of aid, both in absolute  terms, and as a percentage  of GDP.-7  -
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Comparisons  of aid receipts as a percentage of GDP across countries could be somewhat
misleading,  however, since the GDP levels (measured  in U.S. dollars) are affected  significantly  by
the extent of exchanre rate adjustments. This applies equally to intertemporal  comparisons  within
a single country, particularly if exchange rate changes  have been large.  Hence, we also look at
trends in aid per capita in these countries. Figure 3 shows average aid flows per capita for the five
countries in the two periods under consideration.  This indicator also confirms that aid flows
increased considerably  in all countries  when they embarked  upon reforms.  Figure 3 reveals that in
per capita  terms, while  Tanzania  was the largest recipient  of aid in the pre-reform  period, during the
period of reform Malawi  has become  the largest recipient, with aid amounting  to US$44 per capita.
Furthermore, in per capita terms, Ghana and Kenya got amounts that were roughly comparable  to
Tanzania, and only Uganda  got an amount that was significantly  lower (about  US$23).- 8 -
In addition to ODA as measured above, some of the SSA countries have also received
substantial  amounts  of foreign  assistance  in the form of debt reschedulings  at the Paris Club since  the
reform process began.  While the initial reschedulings  were on non-concessional  terms, they have
become increasingly  coi,cessional  since 1988. Of the five countries being compared in this paper,
Tanzania  has received  by far the largest amount  of debt relief under t6e Paris Club.  During the four
Paris Club meetings that it has attended, it was granted debt relief (in cash flow terms) of about
US$2.5 billion. By comparison,  the total debt relief granted  to Uganda is only US$352  million, and
to Malawi it is even smaller at US$78 million. Ghana and Kenya have not received  any debt relief
through the Paris Club.
Thus, by all conventional  measures, Tanzania receives a  very large amount of foreign
assistance.  Even before the beginning of the structural adjustment  programs in  1986, Tanzania
ranked  among those countries  receiving  the largest amount  oi foreign assistance. Since  then, higher
levels  of foreign  assistance  in Tanzania  have  been closely  correlated  with the adoption  of stabilization
and structural adjustment  programs.  To some extent then, foreign assistance  has cushioned the
impact  of economic  adjustment  measures  on the economy. Balance  of payments  support  has allowed
Tanzania  to maintain  relatively  high levels of imports  despite  the sharp devaluations  of the Tanzanian
shilling, which could have been expected  to dampen demand for imported commodities,  including
raw materials  and capital  goods. To determine  whether  Tanzania  became  more dependent  on external
assistance,  or whether  the assistance  was used productively  and has contributed  to a more sustainable
financial position in Tanzania, we will look, qualitatively and quantitatively,  at its prograrn of
structural adjustment  in sections IV and V, respectively. Before  we do thac, however, we explain
the data adjustments  made in the next section.
III.  Data Deficiencies  and Adjustments
111.1 Data Deficiencies
It is difficult  to make an accurate assessment  of the performance  of the Tanzanian economy
because of the severe problems with its official data.  This sectioL  describes three major problems
in Tanzania's macroeconomic  data:  (i) the flawed compilation  of the national  accounts  data; (ii) the
under-recording  of foreign aid in the government  budget; and (iii) the under-recording  of exports in- 9 -
the balance  of payments. This section will focus on our adjustments  to the government budget  and
the balance of payments in Tanzania.'  However, we have not attempted to adjust  the official data
on the level and growth rates of GDP. While for the sake of comparability  it might have been  useful
to similarly adjust  the data of the comparator  countries,  that is beyond the sc'-e  of this paper.  The
data deficiencies  would  appear  less severe in other countries  in the sample, however, and are unlikely
to affect our principal  conclusions.
The national  accounts  severely  underestimate  the level and growth  rate of GDP in Tanzania. 5
This goes beyond the usual problem of capturing  data on the level of activity in the informal sector
of the economy, which is certainly  an issue in Tanzania-and leads to an underestimation  of both its
level of GDP and its growth rate (since  the informal  sector has been the fastest  growing sector)-but
is also common in other developing countries.  In addition, GDP growth is also underestimated
because  even  the growth  that has occurred in the formal sector  has not been fully accounted  for. This
is because the dismantling  of the pervasive state control in many sectors of the economy  that has
accompanied  the reforms has eliminated  some of the national  accounts' traditional sources of data,
such as  the large state trading corporations.  Centralized reporting requirements, such as  in
construction,  are also no longer  in place.  In the absence  of an accurate assessment  of the magnitude
of this problem, this paper does not attempt  to adjust  the level and the growth rate of GDP. 6
4  To ensurm  consistency,  we have used a flow-of-funds model for Tanzania developed by Ahmed (1992), which adjusts
somne  of the key macroeconomic  data for inter-sectorml  flows.
.5  Estimates by Maliyamkono and Bagachwa (1990) indicatc tht  the official statistics undertimate  the level of GDP in
Tanzania  by at least a third.
6  It should be borne in mind that this eould lead to an exaggeration of nur  esulta.  Since  the underestimation of GDP
is likely to be larger than in the comparator countries, all ratios may overstate the degree of aid dependency and
inefficiency of invcstment in Tanzania.-10-
111.2  Adjustments  to the Data
1112.1 Foreign wssistance
Data on disbursements  of foreign assistance  are difficult to obtain, and the poor quality of
aid data leads to inconsistencies  between the aid recorded in the balance of payments  accounts and
that recorded in the fiscal accounts.  Sometimes  the discrepancies  arise from purely definitional
differences,  for example,  depending  on whether  or not debt relief is included. More often, however,
it reflects the difficulties  of accurately measuring  and accounting  for aid receipts.  For some types
of aid, expenditure  is incurred  overseas, and payment  made directly  by donors, so that it never passes
through the Tanzanian government accounts.  In Tanzania, such aid would be foreign technical
assistance  and direct project assistance,  usually in the form of specific commodities,  which together
accounted  for roughly half of total foreign assistance  in the late 1980s. As a result, the balance  of
payments  accounts, which are based on donor reporting, record substantially  larger inflows of aid
than the fiscal accounts.
In the analysis below, two adjustments  have been made to the fiscal data to get a more
accurate picture of total Government  expenditures  and the split between  recurrent and development
expenditures. The first adjustment  is necessary  to get a more precise measure of the fiscal deficit;
the second is necessary  to get a more accurate  measure of public (and hence also total) investment,
which is critical for the measurement  of the productivity  of investment  in Tanzania.
The fiscal data are adjusted in two stages. First, the expenditure  in the development  budget
is adjusted  upward to include all project aid captured in the balance of payments. This adjustment
allows the fiscal accounts to reflect more accurately the level of total government expenditure in-11  -
Tanzania.  Second, since the Tanzanian  development  budget records all donor-funded  expenditure
regardless  of whether it is in fact recurrent in nature, the level of development  expenditure  is not an
appropriate  proxy for public investment. Thus, in a second step, we adjust the fiscal data based on
rough estimates indicating that about one third of  donor-funded expenditures recorded in  the
development  budget  are in fact recurrent, and the breakdown  between  public consumption  and public
investment  in the national  accounts is adjusted  accordingly.
111.2.2 Exports
In Tanzania,  the balance  of payments  does not capture  the large volume  of unofficial  exports.
Since 1984, Tanzanian  citizens  have been allowed  to import a large variety of commodities  if they
used their 'own funds", i.e., if no foreign exchange  was requested  from the Bank of Tanzania. At
the same time, it was illegal to hold foreign exchange, as all receipts had to  be immediately
surrendered. The myth was therefore upheld that Own Funds imports were financed from private
transfers from abroad, and a counterpart  to these imports was recorded as such in the balance of
payments. Evidence  strongly  suggests,  however, that  these imports  are financed  by exports otherwise
not recorded, and we have therefore used the data on private transfers as a proxy for unofficial
exports.  In recent years, we estimate that almost half of exports have remained uarecorded,
accounting  for about 13 percent of GDP.
By distorting the trade balance, the exclusion of these unrecorded exports introduces an
important  flaw in the national  accounts  framework. Within  the familiar  output-absorption  relationship
in equation (1):
Y = C + I +  X-  M  (1)- 12 -
GDP (Y) in Tanzania is calculated  from the production  side.  On the absorption  side, estimates  are
obtained for investment  (I), and imports (M).  For exports (X), only data on official exports are
included, and  consumption (C) is derived as a  residual.  Since the value of  total exports is
underestimated,  this leads to a corresponding  overestimation  of consumption  by the same magnitude.
Gross domestic savings are similarly  affected,  as illustrated  in equation (2):
Y = C + S  (2)
representing the income-expenditure  relationship,  and in which gross domestic savings (S) are a
residual.  The overestimation of  consumption in  equation (1) thus  leads to  a  corresponding
underestimation  of domestic savings in equation (2) by the same arnount.
111.3 Results of the Adjustments
Table  I  presents the official and the adjusted macroeconomic  data,  and illustrates the
enormous  difference  that the adjustments  make to a number of economic  variables, especially  in the
reform period.
Table I
TANZANIA:  Adjusted and Unadjusted Macro Variables
(as a percentage of GDP at current  market prices)
(annual average)
1981-85  1986-90
Unadjusted  Adjusted  Unadjusted  Adjusted
Consumption  89.6  89.3  99.0  86.7
Investment  18.3  18.7  26.1  28.2
Exports  8.7  9.6  13.8  26.9
Gross Domestic  Savings  10.4  10.7  1.0  13.3
Source: IMF and World Bank data, and authors' estimates.- 13 -
The adjustments  show that some of the traditional conclusions  that were drawn about the
impact  of the adjustment  program in Tanzania  may need to be reconsidered. First, rather than being
accompanied  by a stagnation  of exports, the reform program  has seen a sharp improvement  in export
performance, increasing from an average of 9.6 percent of GDP in the pre-reform period to an
average of 26.9 percent during the period of reform. Second, the adjustments  show that as a share
of GDP, consumption  fell from 89.3 percent in the pre-reform period to 86.7 percent during the
reform period, while at the same time investment  rose from 18.7 percent to 28.2 percent, indicating
that the bulk of the foreign assistance  was used for investmnent  rather than for consumption  purposes.
Finally, the increase in foreign  assistance  does not appear to have been detrimental  to the domestic
savings  performance. The adjustments  to the data show that rather than falling from an average of
10.4 percent in 1980-85 to one percent of GDP in  1986-90, domestic savings increased to  13.3
percent in the second half of the decade.
Before examining  how Tanzania's performance  compares  with other countries, in the next
section we  describe the  reforms undertaken by  Tanzania when it embarked upon structural
adjustment.
IV. The Structural  Adjustment Program in Tanzania
From the late 1970s  to the mid-1980s,  Tanzania's economy  was characterized  by extensive
administrative  controls,  and suffered  from severe internal  and external  imbalances,  largely as a result
of inappropriate  exchange  rate and pricing  policies, expansionary  financial  policies, and deep-rooted
structural problems. Between 1980  an-  1985, the economy  experienced  low or negative  growth in
real GDP as production and exports declined and capacity utilization fell.  Inflation was high,
averaging  over 30 percent  per year, the balance  of payments  registered  large deficits, and the country
faced a severe shortage  of foreign  exchange  reserves, leading  to an accumulation  of external  payment
arrears.
An Economic Recovery Program (ERP), supported by the IMF and the World Bank, was
initiated in 1986, aimed both at macroeconomic  stabilization  and structural reform of the economy.
External policies initially addressed the substantial overvaluation of the Tanzanian shilling by
implementing  a series of discrete devaluations. The real effective  exchange  rate depreciated  by over
60 percent in  1986, and by a further 60 percent between 1987 and 1989.  Despite the large- 14 -
adjustments,  the Tanzanian  shilling  remained  overvalued  during the first few years of the adjustment
program, and the spread between the official and the parallel exchange rates, while reduced
considerably,  persisted. In 1992, the reform of the exchange  system was intensified  when Tanzania
introduced  foreign  exchange  bureaus, which are authorized  to buy and sell foreign exchange  at freely
negotiated rates.  At the same time, far-reaiching  liberalization of Tanzania's foreign exchange
legislation  was introduced, which allowed Tanzanian citizens to hold foreign currency deposits at
domestic banks.  The official exchanga rate was adjusted to within 30 percent of the prevailing
parallel rate prior to the opening  of the bureau market, and this spread was reduced  to 20 percent in
the first six months  of the operation of the bureaus.
Trade reform under the ERP was predated by the introduction  of the 'own funds' facility in
1984, which allowed Tanzanian residents to import (fairly) freely when using their own foreign
exchange  resources; a policy  that the Tanzanian  Government  adopted  against  a backgro  ind of severe
shortages  of imported  spare parts and basic consumer  goods. In 1989, Tanzania  introduced  a limited
Open General License (OGL) import system, governed by a short positive list of eligible imports.
The positive list was replaced  by a negative  list of ineligible  goods in 1991, and the scope of freely
accessible imports was widened somewhat, although the financing of the OGL remained wholly
donor-driven. In 1992, import liberalization  was accelerated;  the OGL negative  list was shortened
substantially  to cover  only about  20 percent of the value of non-oil  imports,  and the Bank of Tanzania
started uing  its own foreign exchange  reserves to support the OGL.
Fiscal reforms, which aimed at broadening  the revenue  base and reducing  the overall budget
deficit, were also undertaken during the adjustment  period.  The revenue to GDP ratio increased
substantially,  from an average  of 18.3 percent in 1981-85  to 22.1 percent by 1991. Together with
expenditure  restraint, this allowed for a steady reduction in the overall budget deficit (after grants)
from an average of  10.1 percent in  1981-85 to  3.5 percent by  1991.  At the same time, the
Government  reduced its reliance  on domestic  bank financing  of the deficit, and in 1990  and 1991  the
Government  in fact made net repayments  to the banking  system. The structure  of the tax system was
progressively  reformed, lowering  the maximum  tax rates and reducing the dispersion of the rates,
contributing to  a  more efficient tax  system.  In  addition, steps were taken to  improve the
administration  of the tax system in an effort to improve collection.- 15 -
Major structural  reforms were introduced  in a number  of sectors.  In the agricultural  sector,
the first two years witnessed  the deconfining  of maize and paddy at the primary society level with
private traders allowed  to participate  and negotiate  purchase  prices. Most  domestic  retail  prices were
also decontrolled. In 1990, the fixed official producer prices were replaced by an indicative  price
system, and the role of the National Milling  Corporation, which  previously  held a monopoly  in grain
t arketing, was sharply curtailed, so that by 1991  its operations  were limited  to commercial  milling.
However, while reforms in the marketing of food grains have been substantially  completed, the
traditional  export crops continue  to be subject to a de facto  gover.mnent  monopoly  in their marketing
arrangements,  and for some crops producers continue to receive prices that are well below world
market levels.
In 1991, the Government initiated a comprehensive  reform of the financial system.  The
banking sector was opened to private sector participation,  both domestic  and foreign, and the rigid
structure  of fixed interest rates  and differentials  was replaced  by a single  maximum  lending  rate. The
Bank of Tanzania's role in prudential supervision was strengthened, as regulations were issued
regarding  the licensing  of commercial  banks, loan provisioning,  and capital adequacy  requirements.
Existing commercial  banking institutions were subjected to an in-depth portfolio audit, and their
balance sheets were restructured  with the help of a liquidation  agency and a recapitalization  by the
Government.
In the next section, we examine  the outcome  of the policy  measures  undertaken  by Tanzania,
and compare the success  of the Tanzanian  reform program, as measured  by the adjusted  data, with
that of the four comparator  countries.
V. Cross-Country Policy and Performance Assessment
V.]  Methodology
First,  we compare Tanzania's policy stance with that prevailing in the other reforming
countries, both before and during the reform period, based on four indicators: (i) the real effective
exchange  rate; (ii) the current account  deficit to GDP ratio; (iii) the budget  deficit to GDP ratio; and
(iv) the inflation  rate.  Subsequendy,  we review  four indicators  that are more reflective  of economic- 16-
performance: (i) the real GDP growth rate; (ii) the ratio of domestic investment  to GDP; (iii) the
ratio of domestic savings  to GDP; and (iv) the ratio of exports to GDP.
V.2  Policy Indicators
V.2.1  Real Effective  Exchange  Rate
Table 2 below gives the comparative  results on movements  of real effective exchange  rates
for the five countries, including  Tanzania.
Table 2
Percentage  Changes  In Real Effective Exchange  Rates
(annual average)
1981-85  1986-90
Ghana  5.9  -15.2
Kenya  0.4  -7.1
Malawi  -0.4  -1.0
Uganda  -23.2  -6.0
Tanzania  16.1  -27.8
Source: IMF and World Bank data.
The comparison shows that real exchange rate adjustment  has played a role in all five
countries  under review. Tanzania, in part because  of the size of the initial distortions,  has made the
largest adjustment,  with a real depreciation  of the shilling  averaging  27.8 percent per annum during
1986-90,  in stark contrast  to its appreciation  by 16.1 percent per annum  during 1981-85.
V.2.2  Current Account  Deficit
Figure 4 presents data on the current account  deficit (after grants) as a percentage  of GDP
for the fi  - countries under comparison. It shows  that the initial current account deficit in Tanzania
was much  larger than in the other countries,  except Malawi. In the reform  period, Tanzania's current
account  deficit has widened. Except  for Malawi,  this also occurred in the other reforming  countries,
and may not necessarily  indicate  a 'worsening" of the external situation if all that it reflects is that- 17  -
F1gure  4
CURRENT  ACCOUNT  DEFICIT  AS  RATIO  OF  GDP
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more aid is available  to countries that initiate economic  reforms.  Ultimately,  one needs to look at
an indicator  such as the rate of growth of exports, in order to evaluate  the success  of the reforms in
improving  the external  position. 7
7  A recent survey  by the IMF of 19 countries  tht  are underaking  SAF/ESAF  supported  stabilization  prograrms  found
that although  the underlying  extenal  position  in thee  countries  hu  tended  to strengthen,  with the reserve position
usally  improving,  the current  account  deficit  of the balance  of paymentA  did not show  a clear trend.- 18  -
Flgure  5
GOVERNMENT  DEFICIT  AS  RATIO  OF  GDP
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V.2.3  Fiscal Deficit
Fiscal deficits for the five countries are presented in Figure 5, and illustrate that all five
countries succeeded in reducing the size of the deficit during the period of reform.  In the case of
Tanzania, substantial adjustment  took place during the reform period, and its overall government
budget deficit (after grants) as a ratio of GDP declined from an average of 10.1 percent in the pre-
reform period to 5.6 percent during the reform period.- 19 -
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V.2.4  Innation Rate
Figure 6 presents data on average annual inflation  rates in the two periods for Tanzania and
the four comparator countries. Tanzania's record of controlling  inflation is positive and compares
favorably to  that of the other countries.  Starting from an  initially distorted situation, despite
substantial  devaluation  and price liberalization  during the reform period, Tanzania  managed to keep
inflation  at historical  levels  on average. By comparison,  structural adjustment  in Malawi  and Uganda
was initially  accompanied  by an increase  in the rate of inflation.- 20 -
Flgure 7
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V.3  Performnance  Indicatorn
V.3.1 GDP Growth Rate
GDP growth rates for the five countries  under comparison  are shown in Figure 7.  It reveals
that the rate of economic  growth in all countries  except Malawi  increased, in some cases markedly,
during the period of reform.  In Tanzania, the rate of growth of GDP increased sharply, from 0.5
percent per annum in the pre-reform period, to 4.2 percent per annum in the period of reform.
Nevertheless,  two questions  arise related  ta the performance  of each country's economy. Firstly, was
the level of investment  adequate in each country, or was the country consuming  'too  much' and
investing "too little" ?  Secondly,  did the investment  that took place provide an adequate "rate of- 21 -
return  or, to put it differently, was the growth rate that vas achieved 'satisfactory' relative to the
level of investment  that toak place.
Flgure 8
GDI  AS  RATIO  OF  GDP
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V.3.2  Investment
To answer  these  questions,  we look at two related  indicators: the ratio of investment  to GDP,
and a measure  of the 'rate of return'  or the efficiency  of investment,  i.e., the GDP growth rate as
a ratio of a unit of investment  (defined  as the ratio of gross domestic investment  to GDP).
Figure 8 presents data on the ratio of gross domestic investment  (GDI) to GDP for the five
countries. It reveals  that in all countries  except Malawi, reform was accompanied  by an increase in
the share of GDP being invested.  In the case of Tanzania, there was a dramatic increase, with
investment's  share of GDP increasing  from an already high average of 18.7 percent in the pre-reform- 22 -
period to a still higher average of 28.2 percent in the period of reform. Of the five countries being
compared, this makes Tanzania the country with the highest level of investment  in the period of
reform.
Flgure 9
EFFICIENCY  OF  INVESTMENT
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Figure 9 presents data on the efficiency  of investment,  and reveals one of the shortcomings
of the Tanzanian  reform  program. It shows that both in the pre-reform  period and during the period
of reform, Tanzania has had the lowest efficiency of  investment  of all five countries.  When
compared with Uganda, in particular,  tne results are especially  striking: the efficiency  of investment
in Tanzania  in the reform period is only about a quarter of that in Uganda. Uganda, with an average
investment  share of only  11.0 percent of GDP in the reform period, has been able to achieve an
average growth rate of 6.5 percent per annum during that period.  In contrast, during the same
period, Tanzania with an average investment  share of 28.2 percent of GDP, has only been able to
achieve an average growth rate of 4.2 percent per annum.- 23 -
On the other hand, during the process of reform, the efficiency  of investment  improved in
all countries except Malawi. In fact, the most marked increase  was in Tanzania where, according
to this indi:ater, the efficiency  increased more than five-fold. Despite  that, however, the returns to
investment  remain low in Tanzania.
Figure 10
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V.3.3  Domestic Savings
Figure 10 presents data on the gross domestic :avings (GDS) rate as a ratio of GDP for the
five eountries. It indicates  that the impact  of the structural adjustment  programs  on domestic savings
is mixed. Given the problems  of measuring  the savings rate (usually  calculated  as a residual in the
national  accounts),  and the problems  that many  of the SSA countries  face with respect to the quality- 24 -
of economic  data, cross-country comparisons  of the saving rate should probably be viewed with
caution. Bearing  that in mind,  however, it appears  that, with the exception  of Malawi,  the adjustment
programs have not had a marked negative impact on the domestic savings performance.  This
observation  would contradict  the hypothesis  that the additional  foreign assistance  accompanying  the
adjustment  process leads to a substitution  of foreign  for domestic savings. In the case of Tanzania,
the comparison  underlines  that, after the  data adjustments  described  in Section  111.2  above, Tanzania's
domestic  savings  performance  has not deteriorated  during the adjustment  period, and in fact, is better
than in all other countries in the sample except Kenya.
V3.4  Export Growth
The relative performance  of merchandise  exports in the five countries in shown in Figure
11.'  It shows  that the export  performance  of the countries  under review  has been mixed.  In Ghana,
Kenya, and Tanzania, exports had been declining  prior to reform.  The introduction  of reform led
to a marked improvement  in export performance,  especially in Ghana and Tanzania.  Kenya also
experienced  a reversal in export  performance,  though  not as dramatic  as that in Ghana  and Tanzania.
However, in Malawi  and Uganda, both of which had positive  export growth rates prior to reform,
the situation  was reversed: these countries  experienced  falling  exports during the period of reform.
In Uganda, the reversal is quite severe, with growth rates of exports declining from an average of
8.3 percent per annum  to -0.4 percent per annum.
8  Export volume data for Ghana reflect  only cocoa exponu, while for Uganda they only capture coffee exports. For lack
of information, export volume data for Tanzania include only officially recorded exports.- 25 -
Flgure 11
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V.4  Overall  Assessment
The policy indicators  show a remarkably  similar  policy stance in the countries  under review:
while  real progress was made towards achieving  a more appropriate  real effective  exchange  rate and
towards reducing the size of the overall budget deficit, this was usually not accompanied  by a
reduction in the external current account deficit.'  Only on inflation is the record mixed:  in three
countries  (including  Tanzania)  inflation  declined  during the reform  period, whereas in the other two,
it went up.  However, even in the countries  where inflation  declined, with the exception  of Malawi,
9  The widening of the current accourt deficit that is observed in a number of owntries under  review may be the remk
of the initipl  iTpoit liberlizaio  that  wua put  of most adjuAmnt prganw.  While impoit  leveLs  td  to rine
immediately, expolt,  on the other hud,  my  take longer to rpond,  epepcially in coaun  exporting mainly
pnmauy commodities.  Sevoral factors could account for the la  in export respone,  ach  as inefficiencies in the
agncukumu markeI  uyisms,  infrutatural  conutsahU, and  geStioa lags  in production..
- 26 -
the inflation  rate continues  to be high (about  20 percent or higher), indicating  that, more often than
not, Governments  have encountered  difficulties  in tightening  monetary policy as much as targeted.
In most countries under review, with the exception  of Malawi, the policy stance appears to
have yielded results:  economic  growth has risen, investment  has increased, and domestic savings
rates have stabilized. At the same time, for these countries,  the efficiency  of investment  increased
during the reform period. The data show a clear difference, however, in the efficiency  with which
countries have made use of the, mainly externally  financed, investment.  Particularly  in Tanzania,
the return on investment  has been very low.  Such low rates of efficiency  could be explalned  by the
fact that the Tanzanian  economy  was, and continues  to be, dominated  by a highly inefficient  parastatal
sector, with low capacity utilization.  Most of these parastatals were kept alive only through
substantial  amounts  of fiscal and quasi-fiscal  subsidies. In addition, the regulatory environment  for
the development  of the private sector continues  to hinder the emergence  of a vibrant and efficient
private sector.  While there has been some growth in the informal sector, this sector is not very
capital-intensive,  and its contribution  to the level of investment  in the economy  remains minimal.
VI. Summary and Conclusions
The analysis of aid dependency  and structural adjustment  in Tanzania has generally been
hampered by the poor quality of the data available, which fail to capture a significant  part of the
impact  of the reform programs.  Adjusting  for the most obvious data shortcomings-the inadequate
coverage  of the government  budget  and the flow  of unrecorded  exports-shows that Tanzania's record
under structural  adjustment  is broadly  comparable  to that of other Sub-Saharan  African  countries  with
relatively successful reform programs.  Domestically,  it succeeded in reducing the overall budget
deficit and reduced inflation.  On the  external side,  it improved its competitive position by
depreciating  its exchange  rate in real terms. While the external  current account deficit  widened, this
was a common feature amnong  successful  adjustmnent  programs, as they led to an increased level of
foreign support. The results of these policies  have been equally encouraging. Economic  growth  has
improved, investment  has risen, and exports-including unofficial  exports-have  increased. By all
measures, Tanzania  has done as well, or better, than the comparator  countries.
The striking difference between Tanzania and  the other Sub-Saharan African countries
sampled,  is the efficiency  with which  the additional  foreign assistance  that went into investment  was- 27  -
used. Using  a measure  for return  on investment,  Tanzania's  performanre, although  improving  during
the reform period, lags far behind  the comparator  countries. Thus, while the data do not support the
hypothesis  that foreign aid has replaced domestic savings, it is likely that the return on foreign-
financed investment  has been very low in Tanzania. The low productivity  of investment  can partly
be attributed  to the domination  of the Tanzanian  economy  by a large and inefficient  parastatal  sector.
From  an  economic policy  perspective, three  main  conclusions stand  out.  First,
macroeconomic  and structural  adjustment  has worked in Tanzania, and the increased  foreign support
has probably eased the adjustment  path.  Rather than financing continuing  domestic imbalances,
foreign-assisted  reforms have contributed  to reducing the disequilibria. Second, Tanzania has not
been successful  in using the increase in foreign assistance  efficiently. It is beyond the scope of this
paper to fully determine why productivity  has been low, but future research could focus on the
absorptive  capacity  of the Tanzanian  aid administration  and the composition  of the assistance  received
by Tanzania.  Finally, the emphasis of  economic policy should shift towards increasing the
productivity  of investment. In the Tanzanian  context, this would mean  accelerating  the reform  of the
parastatal  sector, long a favored  recipient of foreign assistance, and improving  the environment  for
private sector development.  The reform of the civil service, which administers the aid flows
accounting  for 50 percent of GDP, also stands out as an area where an improvement  in productivity
- 'd  yield large benefits.- 28 -
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